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Home > MCMP – Logic > Attitudes in Epistemology: Belief vs. Credence


	Podcast:		MCMP – Logic
	Episode:		Attitudes in Epistemology: Belief vs. Credence
	Category:		Society & Culture
	Duration:
	Publish Date:		2015-07-30 20:00:00
	Description:		Summer School on Mathematical Philosophy for Female Students 2015, Julia Staffel (Washington University in St. Louis) gives a lecture (first session) at the Summer School on Mathematical Philosophy for Female Students (26 July - 1 Agusut, 2015) titled "Attitudes in Epistemology: Belief vs. Credence". Abstract: This lecture stream is intended to be an introduction to some central topics in formal epistemology. Formal epistemology is a relatively recent branch of epistemology, which uses formal tools such as logic and probability theory in order to answer questions about the nature of rational belief. An important feature that distinguishes formal epistemology from traditional epistemology is not just its use of formal tools, but also its understanding of the nature of belief. Traditional epistemology tends to focus almost exclusively on what is called ‘outright belief’, where the options considered are just belief, disbelief, or suspension of judgment. By contrast, it is widely accepted among formal epistemologists that this conception of belief is too coarse-grained to capture the rich nature of our doxastic attitudes. They posit that humans also have degrees of belief, or credences, which can take any value between full certainty that something is true, and certainty that it is false. The shift in focus towards degrees of belief has generated a rich research program, parts of which integrate with issues in traditional epistemology, and parts of which are specific to the debate about degrees of belief. Important questions in the field are for example: How are degrees of belief related to outright beliefs? What constraints are there on rational degrees of belief, and how can they be defended? How can we adequately represent degrees of belief in a formal framework? How do ideal epistemological norms bear on what non-ideal agents like us ought to believe? The results of these debates are relevant for many areas of philosophy besides epistemology, such as philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and practical reasoning.
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